Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi v. Woodside Homes Corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi v. Woodside Homes
Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald G. Russell; Timothy B. Smith; Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Stephen Quesenberry; J. Bryan Quesenberry; Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, LC; Attorneys for
Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp, No. 20030993 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4686
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALI S. YAZD and PARVIN YOUSEFI, 
Respondent/Appellee, 
vs. 
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Supreme Court Case No. 20050444 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20030993-CA 
Civil No. 020402197 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari Granted Regarding The Opinion Issued In Case No. 
20030993-CA By The Court Of Appeals For The State Of Utah On The 
Appeal From Order Granting Motion For Summary Judgment In 
Civil No. 020402197 In The Fourth Judicial District Court For The State Of Utah, 
Utah County, Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Judge 
Stephen Quesenberry (8073) 
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Attorneys for Appellees/Respondents 
Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi 
Ronald G.Russell (4134) 
Timothy B.Smith (8271) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & 
LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner 
Woodside Homes Corporation 
- • ^ l l R 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALI S. YAZD and PARVIN YOUSEFI, 
Respondent/Appellee, 
vs. 
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Supreme Court Case No. 20050444 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20030993-CA 
Civil No. 020402197 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari Granted Regarding The Opinion Issued In Case No. 
20030993-CA By The Court Of Appeals For The State Of Utah On The 
Appeal From Order Granting Motion For Summary Judgment In 
Civil No. 020402197 In The Fourth Judicial District Court For The State Of Utah, 
Utah County, Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Judge 
Stephen Quesenberry (8073) 
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Attorneys for Appellees/Respondents 
AH S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi 
Ronald G.Russell (4134) 
Timothy B.Smith (8271) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & 
LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner 
Woodside Homes Corporation 
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The following are parties to this appeal: 
1. Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi ("Buyers"), plaintiffs below and 
respondents/appellee. 
2. Woodside Homes Corporation ("Woodside"), defendant below and 
petitioner/appellant. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Woodside had knowledge of defective soil conditions on the property 
sold to Appellees/Respondents. 
2. Whether conditions existing on a parcel of land near the property sold to 
Appellees/Respondents were material to the conditions existing on Appellees/Respondents' 
lot, whether Woodside knew of those conditions or had a duty to discover them, and whether 
Woodside had a duty to disclose the conditions on the nearby parcel. 
1 
RESPONSE TO BUYERS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In an effort to cloud the issues before the Court, Buyers list thirty allegedly material 
facts and do not respond to Woodside's material facts. The additional "facts," however, miss 
the mark. The basis of Woodside's motion in the district court was that Buyers failed to 
provide any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that Woodside knew about 
the presence of collapsible soils on their lot. Most of Buyers' additional facts deal with 
events that occurred after Buyers' house was constructed and are not relevant to Woodside's 
knowledge about adverse soil conditions on Buyers' lot Buyers' additional material facts 
do not raise an issue of fact concerning Woodside's knowledge, do not contradict the 
conclusions of the Field Report, and are irrelevant to the issues raised by Woodside's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.1 
ARGUMENT 
I. BUYERS CONCEDE THAT WOODSIDE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF 
DEFECTIVE SOIL CONDITIONS ON THEIR PROPERTY. 
In granting Woodside's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court stated that one of 
the issues under review was "[wjhether [Woodside] had knowledge of defective soil 
conditions on the property sold to [Buyers]." (See Order dated July 18, 2005 (emphasis 
added)). Buyers do not address this issue, but instead argue that the issue is whether 
lIn addition, Buyers continue to misstate what is contained in the report that was 
prepared for a parcel near Buyers' lot (the "Delta Report"). Specifically, Buyers assert that 
the Delta Report reveals collapsible soils to a depth of eight feet in the test pit nearest 
Buyer's lot. (Brief of Appellees at 5, n. 1.) That is false. The nearest test pit to Buyers' lot 
was test pit 6, which is 120 feet away from a corner of Buyers' lot and reveals the presence 
of collapsible soils to a depth of five feet. (R. at 429, 436.) Buyers repeat this inaccuracy 
throughout their brief. 
2 
Woodside had knowledge of collapsible soil around the Buyers' property. (Brief of 
Appellees at 8.) That is not the issue before the Court. Buyers' new argument and failure 
to address the issue listed by the Court constitute an implicit admission by them that 
Woodside did not have knowledge of defective soil conditions on their lot.2 Buyers know 
that Woodside did not have such knowledge and have done nothing to show that the district 
court erred in any way in concluding that 
(1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on 
Plaintiffs' lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of soil 
was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting the 
excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would 
support the Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils 
engineer in laying the foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and 
after the completion of Plaintiffs' house, Woodside understood that all of the 
collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot. Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on 
Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that 
would preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside.3 
(R. at 900.) 
2Buyers also present an argument that Woodside has somehow misconstrued the 
appropriate standard of review in this case by citing Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-
501(2)(b). Woodside's discussion of Rule 4-501(2)(b), which was in effect at the time the 
district court entered summary judgment in favor of Woodside and is therefore applicable, 
is included to show the Court that the facts submitted by Woodside in its opening brief were 
(1) undisputed or improperly disputed by Buyers in the district court; (2) properly treated as 
admitted by the district court; and (3) improperly disregarded by the Court of Appeals. 
Because the district court correctly treated Woodside's facts in support of its motion for 
summary judgment as admitted, those facts must be deemed admitted for purposes of this 
appeal, and there is no requirement to construe those facts in any other light, as is urged by 
Buyers. (See R. at 764-68 for a discussion of Buyers' failure to comply with Rule 4-501.) 
3The district court's conclusion is consistent with the holding in Fennell v. Green, 
2003 UT App. 291, 77 P.3d 339, which is discussed in detail in Woodside's Opening Brief. 
3 
Buyers did not dispute the facts relied upon by the district court in determining that 
summary judgment was proper, nor did they dispute them in the Court of Appeals or in its 
brief to this Court. The only knowledge that is at issue in this lawsuit is what knowledge 
Woodside had about collapsible soils on Buyers' lot, and it is undisputed that Woodside 
understood that all defective soils were removed from Buyers' lot. Buyers failed to raise any 
issue of fact precluding entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside and have not 
remedied that deficiency on appeal. 
It is undisputed that Woodside obtained a soils report for the area that included 
Buyers' lot ("SHB Report"). (R. at 471-514.) That report revealed the presence of 
collapsible soils at shallow depths, which were removed during construction of Buyers' 
house. (R. at 400,403-04.) Woodside completed the mass excavation for Buyers' house and 
requested that the soils engineer who provided the earlier soils report inspect the specific site 
where Buyers' house was to be built. The engineer provided a field report for Buyers' lot 
that concluded that the underlying soils would support Buyers' house ("Field Report"). (R. 
at 403-04.) The specific report for the Buyers' lot thus informed Woodside that there were 
no collapsible soils left where the house was built. Because Woodside did not have any other 
knowledge about the soil on Buyers' lot that contradicted the Field Report, there was no duty 
to communicate anything about the soil to Buyers. Cf Fennel!, 2003 UT App. 291, U 12. 
The only report that Woodside had that specifically discussed the conditions on Buyers' lot 
concluded that the underlying soils would support Buyers' house. 
4 
II. BUYERS ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT BY 
FOCUSING ON EVENTS THAT DO NOT ADDRESS THE CONDITIONS ON 
BUYERS' PROPERTY. 
A. The Delta Report is not Material to the Conditions on Buyers' Lot. 
Faced with their inability to raise an issue of fact about Woodside's knowledge of 
adverse soil conditions on their lot, Buyers follow the same pattern they have throughout this 
lawsuit. They ignore the issues this Court wants addressed and instead attempt to distract the 
Court by focusing on the Delta Report, a report that discusses soils conditions on a nearby 
parcel of land, not the property purchased by Buyers.4 
The test pit nearest Buyers' lot discussed in the Delta Report is 120 feet away, 
indicating collapsible soils to a depth of five feet. (R. at 429, 436.) The SHB Report 
indicated that there were collapsible soils on Buyers' lot to a depth of 2/4 feet. The soils 
engineer inspected the underlying soils on Buyers' lot and concluded they would support the 
construction of Buyers' house. So even if Woodside is charged with knowledge of the 
contents of the Delta Report, that knowledge was superseded by the knowledge gained from 
the Field Report provided by a soils engineer. Woodside's action were cautious, not 
fraudulent. Buyers do not mention the Field Report anywhere in their brief and would be 
glad if the Court were to overlook the Field Report as well. The Field Report renders the 
4Woodside has stated that for purposes of this appeal, the Court can infer that 
Woodside was aware of the contents of the Delta Report because the Delta Report does not 
provide any information about Buyers' lot. The undisputed facts below, however, show that 
Woodside did not possess the Delta Report until 1997. (R. at 534.) Woodside has 
consistently taken this position throughout this appeal. 
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contents of the Delta Report obsolete with respect to the conditions on Buyers' lot and 
therefore immaterial. 
The Court of Appeals misapprehended the scope of the Delta Report and essentially 
disregarded the Field Report in concluding that if Woodside possessed the Delta Report it 
had a duty to disclose it. The Court of Appeals creates a burden unrecognized by any other 
court. Under the Court of Appeals holding as it now stands, even if a builder obtains a 
specific report for a subject parcel, it may be held liable for fraud if it fails to disclose a 
report about a nearby parcel that does not discuss the conditions on the subject parcel. Such 
a burden is unreasonable and cannot be allowed to stand as a basis for fraud liability against 
a builder. 
B. The Seawright's Problems are not Material to Conditions on Buyers5 Lot-
Buyers' argue that Woodside committed fraud by not providing information about a 
nearby lot owned at the time by the Seawrights. Unlike Buyers' lot, the Seawright residence 
is located on the property covered by the Delta Report and in addition does not adjoin 
Buyers' lot. (See R. at 752. Buyers' lot is 304. The Seawright lot is 203.) Instead, it is 
approximately four lots (more than a football field) away from Buyers and located at the 
bottom of a swell while Buyers' lot is located at the top of a hill. Any information about the 
Seawright residence that was allegedly learned by Woodside came after the completion of 
the mass excavation for Buyers' house and revealed the existence of collapsible soils to a 
depth of three feet. None of this information is material to Buyers' lot as more than three feet 
of soil was removed from Buyers' lot. 
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III. THE ISSUE OF THE MATERIALITY OF THE DELTA REPORT WAS NOT 
ADDRESSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND WAS PROPERLY RAISED 
WITH THIS COURT IN WOODSIDE'S PETITION. 
Buyers argue that the district court held that the Delta Report was material to the 
conditions on Buyers' lot. (Brief of Appellee at 13.) To support this contention, Buyers' cite 
a line from the district court's ruling ("Ruling") out of context. While the district court did 
state that "the continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information[,]" it 
went on to state that "[g]iven the undisputed facts, this Court finds that [Buyers'] fraudulent 
non-disclosure claim against Woodside fails because there were no facts presented to show 
that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on [Buyers'] lot. . . . " (R. at 899 
(emphasis added).) Clearly, by referring to the "continued presence" of collapsible soils, the 
district court was referring to the continued presence of collapsible soils on Buyers' lot. The 
materiality of the Delta Report or any other information about nearby parcels was not 
addressed by the district court because it was undisputed that Woodside did not have 
knowledge of collapsible soils on Buyers' lot. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals addressed 
the materiality of the Delta Report and that issue is properly before this Court in accordance 
with its Order of July 18, 2005. As is discussed in Woodside's opening brief, the Delta 
Report is not material because it does not discuss the conditions on Buyers' lot, and 
regardless of what is contained in the Delta Report, it is superseded by the Field Report, 
which stated that the soils on Buyers' lot were suitable for construction. 
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IV, BUYERS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH FENNELL V. GREEN OR SMITH V. 
FRANDSEN. 
A. Under Fennell Woodside Had No Duty to Disclose Information to Buyers. 
Buyers mischaracterize the district court's Ruling in an attempt to bolster the holding 
of the Court of Appeals. The Ruling does not discuss the Delta Report. (R. at 898-902.) 
The Delta Report is only mentioned in the background section of the Ruling. Contrary to the 
Court of Appeals' belief that the district court found that the Delta Report was material, the 
district court made no such determination.5 
Buyers contend that the district court did not rely on Fennell because it did not cite 
Fennell in its Ruling. This argument belies the fact that Woodside briefed and argued 
Fennell to the district court and that the Ruling precisely follows the analysis contained in 
Fennell. The Fennell court concluded "Fennell's fraudulent nondisclosure claim against 
Wall and Green fails because there were no facts presented to show that Wall or Green knew 
of a possible landslide condition on [Fennell's] lot.. .." Fennell 2003 UT App 291, ^ 11. 
Just as the Fennell court concluded that there was no fraud when the developer was not aware 
of adverse conditions on the subject lot, the district court held that there was no fraud where 
5The Court of Appeals states that "[t]he sole basis for the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment was its conclusion that Woodside did not know of the Delta Report prior 
to selling the property to the Buyers." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, 
TJ 12, n. 3. The Ruling states "[t]he only issue in dispute is what knowledge Woodside had 
regarding collapsible soils on [Buyers'] lot[,]" and goes on to conclude that "[Buyers] have 
not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on 
[Buyers'] lot," (R. at 900 (Buyers incorrectly attribute this holding to the Yazd court in their 
brief (Brief of Appellee at 21).) The sole basis for the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment was Buyers' failure to produce any evidence that Woodside had knowledge of 
collapsible soils on Buyers' lot. 
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Buyers presented no evidence of Woodside having knowledge of adverse conditions on 
Buyers' lot. (R. at 898-900.) 
Buyers' attempts to distinguish Fennell also fail. The fact that Fennell involved a 
developer, that the soils report for the lot was available for inspection, and that the soils 
engineer testified that he thought the lot was fine have nothing to do with the Fennell court's 
ultimate holding. Buyers again completely ignore the Field Report and attempt to focus the 
Court's attention on the Delta Report, comparing the Delta Report to the report discussed in 
Fennell. That comparison fails because the Field Report, not the Delta Report, is the 
equivalent to the soils report discussed in Fennell. The Field Report shows that Woodside 
did not engage in fraudulent activity because it informed Woodside that there were no 
adverse soils conditions on Buyers' lot. 
B. Woodside Fulfilled Its Duties Under Frandsen. 
Buyers articulate three duties allegedly set out in Frandsen: (1) a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type 
of ordinary, average dwelling house, (2) a duty to disclose to the purchaser any condition 
which the builder knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable 
for such residential building, and (3) upon inquiry, the builder must disclose information it 
has developed in the course of the subdivision process which is relevant to the suitability of 
the land for its expected use. (Brief of Appellee at 23 (citing Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 
55, 94 P.3d 919).) Woodside has fulfilled all those duties.6 
6Also of note is that Buyers have been compensated for their alleged damages under 
the contractual warranty provided by Woodside. Buyers rec eived an award for their contract 
9 
By seeking and obtaining a soils report for Buyers lot when it was aware of the 
collapsible soils to a depth of 2/4 on Buyers' lot and (for purposes of this appeal) to a depth 
of five feet in a location 120 feet from a corner of Buyers' lot, Woodside was exercising 
reasonable care to insure that the Buyers' lot was suitable for construction of an average 
dwelling house. A soils engineer informed Woodside that the underlying soils on Buyers' 
lot were suitable for construction. There is nothing more that Woodside could have done to 
exercise reasonable care. Thus, Woodside met the first Frandsen duty. 
Once Woodside obtained the Field Report, it did not know of any condition that would 
make Buyers' lot unsuitable for construction, meeting the second Frandsen duty. Buyers 
believe that failing to turn over the Delta Report constitutes a violation of this duty. Again, 
Buyers argument ignores the Field Report. Even if Woodside was aware of the contents of 
the Delta Report, it does not address the conditions (specifically or generally) on Buyers' lot. 
The Field Report does address the specific conditions on Buyers' lot and informed Woodside 
that there were no conditions that would make Buyers' lot unsuitable for a residential 
building. 
Finally, Buyers never made an inquiry to Woodside about information developed in 
the subdivision process so the third Frandsen duty was never triggered. Despite Buyers' 
contention, complaining about alleged problems in a house several years after it was built and 
claims when those claims were arbitrated, and Woodside satisfied that award. (See 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot 
filed in the Court of Appeals on November 19, 2004 and Exs. A-C thereto.) 
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sold cannot constitute an inquiry. Because Woodside has met all of the duties triggered 
under it, Frandsen cannot serve as a basis for Buyers' fraud claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Buyers are correct that Utah is undergoing tremendous growth and as a result seeing 
a tremendous amount of home construction. Nevertheless, the duty which the Court of 
Appeals adopted is unprecedented. Buyers would have the Court believe that home 
purchasers are completely without recourse unless the duty set out by the Court of Appeals 
is adopted by this Court. Home purchasers can and do obtain protection by obtaining a 
contractual warranty, as the Buyers did in this case. Woodside is a conscientious home 
builder and has met all of its duties under Utah law. It does not cut comers and did not cut 
comers in this case. Woodside took steps to ensure that the underlying soils would support 
Buyers' house by obtaining the Field Report. Woodside did not defraud Buyers, and Buyers 
have presented no evidence to show that Woodside was aware of any adverse condition on 
Buyers' lot. As such, Woodside respectfully requests thai the decision of the Court of 
Appeals be reversed and the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in 
favor of Woodside be affirmed. 
DATED this A day of October, 2005. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN] GEE & LOVELESS 
sJZ. 
. Russell 
Timothy B. Smith 
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner 
Ronald 
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